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Abstract
This paper proposes foundations and a methodology for survey-based tracking of well-being. First, we
develop a theory in which utility depends on “fundamental aspects” of well-being, measurable with
surveys. Second, drawing from psychologists, philosophers, and economists, we compile a
comprehensive list of such aspects. Third, we demonstrate our proposed method for estimating the
aspects’ relative marginal utilities—a necessary input for constructing an individual-level well-being
index—by asking ~4,600 U.S. survey respondents to state their preference between pairs of aspect
bundles. We estimate high relative marginal utilities for aspects related to family, health, security, values,
freedom, happiness, and life satisfaction.
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The cornerstone of neoclassical welfare economics is the principle of revealed
preference, according to which the ultimate criterion for judging what makes a person better off
is what she chooses, in a situation in which she is well-informed about the consequences of her
options. Yet for most policy decisions, a government cannot directly infer an individual’s
welfare from her choices over policies because individuals rarely make such choices.1 Hence in
practice economists often rely on revealed preference indirectly, evaluating policy options by
how they affect indicators—most prominently, GDP—that can be viewed as summarizing, under
some assumptions, a set of generally-desired outcomes. But because GDP and other available
indicators have known limitations as well-being measures, economists have been seeking
additional indicators that go “beyond GDP” (for a recent survey, see Fleurbaey, 2009). In this
paper, we focus on developing one such indicator: an individual-level index that combines
together different aspects of well-being that may be measured by survey questions.
As candidate measures of individuals’ well-being, economists and psychologists have
recently been investigating survey measures of “subjective well-being” (SWB); while we use this
term to refer to any subjective assessment of some aspect of well-being, economists have
primarily focused on questions about one’s own happiness or life satisfaction. Because responses
to such questions reflect a wide range of experiences, including those unrelated to market
exchange (Diener and Seligman, 2004; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006), many researchers have
advocated conducting nation-wide SWB surveys and using the responses to calculate indicators
alongside GDP-like measures (e.g., Diener, 2000; Diener, 2006, signed by 50 researchers;
Layard, 2005; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009).
Although these proposals are controversial among economists, policymakers have begun
to embrace them. For example, starting in April 2011, the U.K. Office of National Statistics
began including the following SWB questions in its Integrated Household Survey, a survey that
reaches 200,000 adults annually (ONS, 2011):
Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?
Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?
1

Holding a referendum on every issue would incur prohibitively high transaction costs. Moreover, for
many issues, even a direct vote would not reveal preferences because voters lack full information about—
and might systematically mispredict—the consequences of alternative policy options (see Gilbert, 2006,
for evidence on systematic misprediction of happiness).
2

Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?
Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile?
According to Prime Minister David Cameron, “it’s time we focused not just on GDP but on
GWB—general wellbeing.”2 Other governments around the world have expressed similar
intentions to field SWB surveys and use the responses to guide policy.3
Notwithstanding this recent enthusiasm, there are many open questions regarding the
endeavor of tracking well-being with surveys. Among the most urgent practical questions are the
following two. First, which SWB questions should governments ask? It is increasingly
recognized that more than one question is likely to be needed because SWB is multi-dimensional
(e.g., Ryff, 1989; Kahneman and Deaton, 2010) and because widely-used SWB measures may
not capture all factors that enter into preferences (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones,
2012, 2013). Current proposals for survey questions, however, rely on different experts’ own
readings of the SWB literature rather than on a systematic method.4 Second, how should
responses to different questions be weighted relative to each other? Current proposals are
virtually silent on relative weighting (in some cases purposefully so). But in practice, due to an
apparently inevitable demand for summary indicators, ad hoc weights often end up being applied
implicitly by users or explicitly in published indices (Micklewright, 2001).
This paper has two overarching purposes. First, we propose a framework, grounded in a
preference-based theory, for conceptualizing and discussing survey-based measurement of wellbeing. Second, we demonstrate a disciplined approach, anchored in revealed preference—albeit
based on hypothetical choices—to applying our framework to the development of well-being
surveys and indices. We emphasize that relative to the many decades of theoretical and practical
2

“David Cameron aims to make happiness the new GDP.” The Guardian, November 14, 2010.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/14/david-cameron-wellbeing-inquiry as accessed on May
13, 2011.
3
For example, in December 2011, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on National
Statistics convened the first in a series of meetings of a “Panel on Measuring Subjective Well-Being in a
Policy Relevant Framework.” As part of its Better Life Initiative, the OECD has held several conferences
on “Measuring Well-Being for Development and Policy Making” since May, 2011; the organization’s
Better Life Index website (www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org) invites visitors to rate thirty-six countries by
interactively creating indices from eleven dimensions of well-being that include SWB. Moreover, this
interest is not limited to rich, Western countries; indeed, Bhutan is considered the pioneer of Gross
National Happiness, a concept conceived there in the 1970s.
4
For prominent—and conflicting—proposals to the U.K. Office of National Statistics, see Dolan, Layard,
and Metcalfe (2011) and Deaton, Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone (2011).
3

work that underlies the present well-developed state of measures such as GDP, efforts to
construct and apply survey-based well-being indicators are still in their infancy. Hence, we view
this paper as primarily methodological, proposing an agenda for a new approach, and we view
our specific contributions as first steps to be improved upon by future work.
In section I, we present our theoretical framework. We assume that utility u(w) depends
on a vector w of fundamental aspects of well-being, for example those that can be measured with
survey questions similar to the four above. Any vector proportional to the vector of marginal
utilities Dwu(w) can then be used as relative weights for combining the components of w into an
individual-level index that tracks small changes in well-being. For large changes in the aspects,
the index can still be used to track changes in well-being but only provides a partial welfare
ordering. While we do not make novel contributions regarding how to aggregate well-being
indices across individuals, our framework could be used in conjunction with existing approaches
to aggregation.
In section II, we describe our attempt to identify the major components of w. We compile
a list—of 136 aspects of well-being—aimed at including all the main factors that have been
proposed as important components of well-being in a sample of major works in philosophy,
psychology, and economics, from Maslow (1946) to Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009) and
beyond. The list includes aspects that have been considered as fundamental, as well as broader,
“combination aspects” that may single-handedly capture many fundamental aspects. While it
includes SWB measures widely used by economists (e.g., happiness and life satisfaction), it also
includes other items, such as goals and achievements, freedoms, engagement, morality, selfexpression, relationships, and the well-being of others. While far from exhaustive, our list
represents, as far as we know, the most comprehensive effort to date to construct such a
compilation (cf., Alkire, 2002).
Next, as described in section III, we design and conduct a survey to estimate a vector
proportional to the vector of marginal utilities Dwu(w). We present more than 4,600 Internet
survey respondents—a demographically diverse (albeit not representative) sample of the U.S.
adult population—with sets of hypothetical-choice scenarios. We first provide detailed scenario
instructions and an example. Then, in each scenario we elicit respondents’ stated preference
between two options that differ only on how they rate on a small set of aspects. For example:

4

In our estimation procedures, the dependent variable is the response to the choice question
above, and the independent variables are the relative ratings of the aspects (the “X”s) in the table
above. Because we randomly assign which aspects vary between the options and by how much,
we can identify the relative marginal utility of each aspect. We call this stated-preference survey
for estimating relative marginal utilities a SP survey to distinguish it from a SWB survey that
would measure individuals’ levels of aspects of well-being.5 We highlight differences between
our specific SP-survey implementation and the theoretical ideal that we anticipate governments
could approximate more closely.
Section IV presents our main survey findings. Using personal-choice scenarios similar to
the one above and pooling across all of our respondents we find, among other things, that while
commonly-measured aspects of well-being such as happiness, life satisfaction, and health are
5

Broadly speaking, our SP survey can be viewed as an application of conjoint analysis (Green and Rao,
1971). In the context of assessing welfare, our survey design is closely related to the method proposed in
Adler and Dolan (2008), who argue that policymakers’ weighting of different aspects of well-being
should be informed by how survey respondents rank alternative “lives” that vary in the aspects. They
illustrate their method with an exploratory study of 72 undergraduate respondents and four aspects:
income, health, happiness, and life expectancy. Relatedly, Adler (2012) proposes a conceptual framework
similar to ours, viewing w as a hybrid of “mental” (e.g., emotions) and “non-mental” (e.g., freedoms)
aspects. He encourages using stated-preference surveys for learning about u(w).
5

indeed among those with the largest relative marginal utilities, other aspects that are measured
less commonly have relative marginal utilities that are at least as large. These include aspects
related to family (well-being, happiness, and relationship quality), security (financial, physical,
and with regard to life and the future in general), values (morality and meaning), and having
options (freedom of choice, and resources). Using policy-choice scenarios, in which respondents
vote between two policies that differ in how they affect aspects of well-being for everyone in the
nation, we continue to find the patterns above and in addition find high relative marginal utilities
for aspects related to political rights, morality of others, and compassion toward others, in
particular the poor and others who struggle. While we find some differences across
demographic-group and political-orientation subpopulations of our respondents, most of these
main results hold across the subpopulations we examine.
We present a long list of robustness checks in section V. These include exploring the
sensitivity of our findings to: estimating alternative econometric specifications; excluding
alternative candidates for (non-fundamental) combination aspects from the estimation;
examining subsets of our respondents based on the time they took to complete the survey; and
varying survey design elements that we randomly manipulated.
In section VI we return to the two practical questions above—which items to include on a
SWB survey, and how to weight them to construct an index—and discuss potential solutions,
both in theory and in practice. We outline directions for thinking about implementation
challenges such as avoiding double counting and reducing the number of survey questions.
Our paper contributes to a long line of research on social welfare measures, recently
surveyed by Fleurbaey (2009) and Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013).6 Our approach has the
appealing feature that it accommodates several traditions that are often considered conflicting. It
is, at the same time, “super-liberal” (Fleurbaey, 2009) since we weight aspects based solely on
our respondents’ stated preferences; “welfarist” (Sen, 1979a) since utility can be viewed as our
exclusive criterion for judging well-being;7 and an application of Sen’s (1985, 1992)
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Fleurbaey’s (2009) title, “Beyond GDP: The Quest for a Measure of Social Welfare,” inspired the title
of our paper.
7
Sen (1979a) defines welfarism as the imposition of the following “informational constraint”: “[t]he
judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken
as an increasing function of, the respective collections of individual utilities in these states.” Sen criticizes
this notion and argues that information beyond individual utilities may be needed for making moral
6

“capabilities” approach since the vector w can be considered to include both functionings
(achieved states, e.g., material standard of living, health) and capabilities (opportunities for such
achievements, e.g., freedoms).8 Indeed, as described above, we find that our respondents put a
large weight on capabilities, especially in policy scenarios.9
The central assumption underlying our SP-survey methodology is that a person’s stated
preference in our abstract scenarios is an unbiased measure of her (“true”) preference.10 This
assumption is surely wrong; indeed, there are known ways in which stated preference is biased
relative to incentivized choice, for example when one choice option is viewed as more socially
desirable (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Ding, Grewal, and Liechty, 2005). Nonetheless, we
believe it is more attractive to rely on what people’s own stated preferences suggest about what
they themselves care about than to paternalistically rely on the opinions and introspections of
“experts” (such as researchers and policymakers) regarding which aspects to track and how to
weight them. Moreover, some of the objections to using stated preferences as if they are
descriptive of incentivized choice may have less force when stated preferences are used
normatively. In particular, while hypothetical choices in abstract scenarios may elicit metapreferences (the preferences people want themselves to have), rationalized preferences (more
deliberated, internally consistent preferences), or otherwise laundered preferences (e.g., omitting
“dirty” preferences such as racism), it is sometimes argued that these are more relevant for
evaluating welfare than the preferences that describe actual behavior. For example, our SP
survey may put respondents in a deliberative frame of mind, causing them to weight emotional
judgments. To partially address this concern, our approach attempts to include important specific
examples of such information as additional arguments in the utility function (i.e., as elements of w).
8
From the capabilities-approach perspective, our empirical effort is an attempt to address the “index
problem,” namely the problem of choosing weights for functionings and capabilities. This problem has
been considered a key obstacle to systematically applying the capabilities approach (Fleurbaey, 2009) and
is in general central to the construction of multi-dimensional well-being indices (Decancq and Lugo,
2013). Although Sen initially opposed combining measures of capabilities and functionings into an index,
he later seems to have become more sympathetic (Micklewright, 2001).
9
This also gives some support to Rawls’s (1971) contention that most people would prioritize basic rights
ahead of other goods.
10
While we interpret our results in light of this assumption, we believe that our empirical contribution can
be useful also in the context of alternative theoretical perspectives, such as that of Fleurbaey, Schokkaert,
and Decancq (2009), who single out a specific survey question—a life satisfaction question—and propose
to use it as the primary source of information about preferences, and those explored by Decancq, Van
Ootegem, and Verhofstadt (2011), who pre-select nine survey questions and evaluate alternative
weighting schemes by directly asking survey respondents how important they consider each of the nine to
be. In particular, our approach can inform researchers regarding the link between different survey
questions and stated preferences.
7

factors less than they do in “real life”—but doing exactly that is common prescriptive advice for
avoiding emotion-induced mistakes (e.g., Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and
Rabin, 2003, pp.1238–1240). We discuss related points when interpreting our results (in section
IV).
In section VII, we mention some concerns regarding tracking well-being with surveys
that we do not address. We conclude by discussing possible extensions of our approach, and we
point to a few readily actionable steps suggested by our findings. Throughout, we highlight the
limitations of our specific implementation and point out promising directions for further
developing the agenda we propose.

I. Theoretical Framework
We start with the standard framework for aggregating an individual’s consumption of
different commodities. This framework underlies empirical expenditure- and income-based
measures of well-being, including GDP; below we adapt it for conceiving a well-being index.
We then discuss how this index-oriented framework can be viewed more generally as an
application of choice theory, with preferences elicited via our SP survey. We use this more
general perspective to highlight the assumptions underlying the construction and use of our
proposed index.
In the consumption context, an agent’s well-being is represented by a continuouslydifferentiable utility function u(c). The vector,

,…,

′, represents the quantities of M

market goods. Following a change in the consumption vector, ∆ , the change in utility can be
approximated up to an arbitrary multiplicative scale as

(1)

′∙∆

∆

∆

∝

∆

.

The proportionality follows because, at the optimum, as long as the consumer chooses a strictly
positive amount of each good
times the market price

, each marginal utility

. By fixing prices,

,…,

is equal to a Lagrange multiplier

, at their levels in some base period and

measuring the agent’s consumption vector over time, the government can track a quantity index
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of real consumption, ∑

. For small changes in , changes in this index are

approximately proportional to changes in utility.
Perhaps the biggest limitation of this consumption-based approach is that it only
considers a narrow set of determinants of well-being. To broaden its scope, we follow other
researchers in shifting attention away from standard consumption goods (for example, rice, TVs,
train rides) and toward more fundamental aspects of well-being (for example, health, emotional
states, freedoms). This approach is intended to be more general in that these fundamental aspects
include all objects of desire for individuals regardless of which specific consumption goods are
in an agent’s choice set at a given time and place. In this framework, consumption matters for
well-being through its effects on these more fundamental aspects of well-being, but nonconsumption determinants of well-being are also accounted for via their effects on these
fundamental aspects.11
Consider the utility function u(w), where

,…,

′ represents the quantities of J

fundamental aspects. Analogously to the consumption formula above (equation 1), a change in
utility resulting from a change in the fundamental aspects can be approximated as

∆

(2)

′∙∆

∆

.

Instead of measuring the agent’s consumption vector c, the government would measure her
fundamental-aspects vector w; and instead of tracking a quantity index for standard consumption
goods, the government would track ∑
period. We term ∑

, with the marginal utilities fixed at a base

the agent’s well-being index. Since the marginal utilities are

defined only up to an arbitrary multiplicative constant, so is the index. From the perspective of
this theoretical framework, the purpose of a SWB survey is to measure the

’s.

Because there are no observable prices that can be used in place of the marginal
utilities—by which here and henceforth we mean the relative marginal utilities—the government

11

This perspective is essentially a variant of consumer theory in which preferences are defined over
goods’ characteristics (Lancaster, 1966); the fundamental aspects can be thought of as the ultimate
underlying characteristics that people care about when making choices.
9

will need direct marginal-utility estimates in order to calculate the agent’s well-being index. The
purpose of our SP survey is to demonstrate a method for generating such estimates. We envision
governments applying such a method on nationally representative samples and, because the
marginal utilities may change as w changes, doing so on a regular basis (just as prices are
currently re-measured on a regular basis).
This description of our theoretical framework highlights the analogy between our
proposed index and standard consumption-based indices. Our framework, however, is more
general. Indeed, our SP survey could in principle be extended to elicit an individual’s entire
indifference map by designing the survey to elicit stated preference between every pair of
(explicitly and fully listed) vectors of conceivable responses to a SWB survey. Regardless of the
shape of preferences, ordinal welfare comparisons could then be made between any of the
individual’s SWB-survey occasions. In practice, however, such an unrestricted approach is
unimplementable with more than a handful of aspects for two reasons. First, even if assuming
transitivity and monotonicity eliminated the need to directly compare every pair of aspects, the
number of pairwise comparisons required on the survey would grow exponentially with the
number of elements in w. Second, each such pairwise comparison would require respondents to
compare two long vectors of aspects, arguably an excessive cognitive demand on survey
respondents. Moreover, even if the list of aspects were short, stated-preference data may be less
reliable the farther the vectors to be compared are from the respondent’s current w because it
may be more difficult for respondents to introspect regarding distant, unfamiliar situations.
Our approach in this paper—and the resulting design of our SP survey detailed in section
III below—can be understood as a more practical version of this generalized procedure, whereby
we restrict ourselves in two ways. First, we elicit preferences only locally at the status quo,
where we think stated-preference data are most reliable.12 Second, we assume that preferences
can be represented by a continuously-differentiable utility function, and hence are locally linear.
Local linearity makes the SP survey more feasible: the absence of complementarities allows us to
alleviate respondents’ cognitive task by presenting them with a series of pairwise comparisons
that involve a tradeoff between as few as two aspects at a time deviating from current w; and the
12

While our scenarios do not explicitly frame the choice as being relative to respondents’ current aspect
levels, we believe that this is the natural interpretation (see language in the example scenario in the
Introduction). One could more explicitly instruct respondents to interpret the choice this way by simply
adding a few words to the scenarios’ preamble.
10

fact that the functional form of local preferences is known reduces the number of SP-survey
questions needed to estimate the (local) indifference surface. The continuous-differentiability
assumption underlies the discussion surrounding equation (2) above: as long as w remains within
a small neighborhood around the w prevailing when a SP survey was conducted, the well-being
index can be used to make welfare comparisons between SWB-survey occasions.
Such a local welfare ordering may often be sufficient, as many individuals may have
reasonably stable w’s for long periods of time. However, under some circumstances w may drift
away (as time goes by) or even jump discontinuously (perhaps due to a change in policy or in
personal circumstances). Between a w within the neighborhood where a SP survey was
conducted and a w outside that neighborhood, the index does not provide a complete welfare
ordering. Nonetheless, under additional assumptions on preferences, the index could provide a
partial welfare ordering. For example, suppose that preferences are convex. Figure 1 is adapted
from Sen (1979b) who discusses how convexity generates a partial ordering in the context of a
real consumption index. The line AB—the tangent to the indifference curve going through
whose slope is in our case estimated with a SP survey at

,

—partitions all bundles into a

southwest set and a northeast set. Using the weights calculated from a SP survey at

, the index

values decrease from

to every

to every aspect bundle in the southwest and increase from

bundle in the northeast. Thus if the index value decreases from

to any bundle (e.g.,

in the

figure), no matter how far away, then due to convexity, we can conclude that the individual is
worse off. If the index value increases from
in the figure), indifferent (

), or better off (

bundle, then it is possible that

, however, the individual could be worse off (
). If a new SP survey were conducted at the new

would lie in the new southwest set, completing the ordering by

revealing that the new bundle is unambiguously better than

. It may also be possible to make a

partial ordering more complete by applying transitivity to a sequence of unambiguous pairwise
comparisons.
In summary, with a given set of weights estimated at

, our index provides a complete

local ordering, and a partial global ordering, of w’s. Locally, increases and decreases in the index
are both interpretable as reflecting welfare changes, while globally, comparisons require more
involved logic such as that above.
Although in this paper we focus primarily on survey-based measures of the fundamental
aspects that comprise w, our theoretical framework also applies when some or all of the aspects
11

are measured objectively. For example, some dimensions of health could be measured with
physiological tests, and, arguably, some freedoms could be quantified. Indeed, widely-used
indices such as the U.N.’s Human Development Index and Okun’s “misery index” (the sum of
the inflation and the unemployment rates) consist entirely of objective measures that are
combined by using ad hoc weights. Regardless of whether the components of w are measured
objectively or subjectively, we propose using a data-driven method for estimating the marginal
utilities; our SP survey is an attempt at implementing such a method. Even with objective
measures that have observable prices, directly estimating the marginal utilities may be
considered an alternative to making the assumptions necessary for using prices as weights.
While our theory above focuses on constructing a well-being index for a single agent, in
order to construct a national index in practice, governments would need to, first, construct
indices for many people and, second, aggregate them. To construct indices for many people, a
method such as our SP survey could be used to estimate marginal utilities for each person in a
representative sample. Since doing so may require a long (and hence potentially expensive)
survey—especially if w includes many aspects—in practice pooling data within respondent
subpopulations may sometimes be a required compromise. Given our own very limited
resources, when demonstrating our methodology in section IV our main specification pools data
across all respondents—something that governments should avoid, as we discuss in section VI.
How to aggregate utility across individuals is a central question of welfare economics and
an active area of research in the literature on social choice. Although this paper focuses on
constructing an individual-level well-being index, in principle our framework and empirical
contribution are compatible with a variety of approaches to aggregation, as we briefly discuss in
section VII.

II. Aspects of Well-Being
A major obstacle to any real-world application of our theoretical framework is that no
one knows which fundamental aspects comprise the vector w. Indeed, different authors have
proposed different sets of aspects as important components of well-being. Our treatment of
aspects as arguments of utility requires that for our purposes, any proposed set must be
exhaustive, i.e., include all arguments of preferences; and it must comprise aspects that are nonoverlapping, i.e., that are conceptually distinct.
12

Our approach in this paper is to construct as comprehensive a list of candidate
fundamental aspects as we practically can. We additionally include what we believed would be
broader, non-fundamental “combination aspects”—by which we mean facets of well-being that
are not themselves fundamental but contain information regarding multiple fundamental
aspects—which might capture more of the variation in u. Our comprehensiveness has three
advantages. First, it reduces the risk of missing important components of w, thereby making the
list closer to exhaustive. Second, it allows us to minimize the influence of our own ex ante
beliefs on the set that emerges as important from our analysis.13 Third, it renders our results as
broadly useful as possible, since different researchers can focus on the subset of our results that
pertains to the aspects they believe comprise w—or to those they happen to have data on in an
existing social survey. On the other hand, our attempt to be comprehensive has the drawback of
increasing the likelihood that different aspects on our list overlap with each other. Our analysis in
section V, in which we exclude some potentially overlapping aspects from the analysis, suggests
that such possible overlap does not meaningfully affect our marginal utility estimates. However,
in selecting which aspects to include in a well-being index, a method will be required for
ensuring that fundamental aspects are not double-counted. We summarize a proposal for such a
method in section VI; we discuss it in more detail and formalize it in the Web Appendix.
In this section we summarize our method for compiling our master list of 136 aspects of
well-being (see table 2 for a version of the list). The list, as well as much more detail regarding
the process of compiling it, dividing it into different sub-lists, and creating different versions of
it, is available in the Web Appendix.
Our list draws from six classes of survey measures. First, we include single-question
SWB measures, modeled after the SWB questions most commonly asked in large-scale social
surveys (for example, those asked in or proposed for the U.K. survey discussed above). These
include mostly measures that are considered evaluative/cognitive (e.g., life satisfaction)—i.e.,
measures based on questions that may trigger respondents to engage deliberative cognitive
processes in order to evaluate their life—and those that are considered hedonic/affective (e.g.,

13

That said, in compiling the list we draw exclusively on English-speaking sources, introducing a cultural
bias—but one compatible with our respondents’. In addition, “dirty” aspects (such as racist objectives)
are typically absent from our sources, but as we discuss in section IV, the few aspects on our list that
could be considered “dirty” (e.g., social status) are ranked very low by our SP-survey respondents
anyway.
13

felt happiness)—i.e., measures that are aimed at eliciting respondents’ positive or negative
feelings.
Second, we include measures based on items in multi-question survey measures of SWB.
These are primarily drawn from scales commonly used in psychology, such as the PANAS
(Positive and Negative Affect Scale).
The third and largest class contains aspects of well-being proposed by prominent
economists, psychologists, and philosophers that are not typically elicited on large surveys. We
drew on proposals from the Stiglitz Commission (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009), the
systematic compilation effort by Alkire (2002), as well as many classic sources (e.g., Maslow,
1946; Sen, 1985; Nussbaum, 2000) and more recent contributions (Seligman and Diener, 2004;
Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008; Graham, 2011). A complete list of the works we reviewed,
including references by aspect, is given in the Web Appendix. The many aspects in this class
include some that can be understood as capabilities, i.e., access to resources, choice sets, and
freedoms. The aspects also include some that would be considered eudaimonic SWB measures
(for example, having a meaningful life; Ryff, 1989). Such measures relate to human thriving or
flourishing; the Greek word eudaimōn is commonly translated to mean happy in an Aristotelian
sense, i.e., as associated with having a meaningful, valuable, or worthwhile life.
The fourth class of measures resulted from our own introspection and discussion. Some
of our proposed additions were confirmed to be important in our past work (Benjamin, Heffetz,
Kimball, Rees-Jones, 2012), and others resulted from extensive discussions among ourselves and
with colleagues. Some reflect our attempt to break down important parts of life into more
fundamental aspects. For example, while many writers have proposed that religion is important
for well-being, we refined “religion” into 15 aspects of well-being that may help explain the
value of religion but that are also valued by many non-religious people (e.g., “you having people
around you who share your values, beliefs and interests”).
While these four classes of measures represent our attempt to include fundamental
aspects in our list, our fifth and sixth classes serve different purposes. The fifth class represents
our attempt to formulate combination-aspect survey questions that, if broad enough, might even
serve as good empirical proxies for u itself, thus possibly obviating the need for an index. These
include novel (in wording, not necessarily in concept), evaluative well-being measures, such as
“how much you like your life” and “the overall well-being of you and your family.”
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Finally, as a sixth class, we crafted survey versions of “objective” indicators that are
widely-used as measures of well-being, such as the rates of GDP growth, inflation, and
unemployment, or income inequality. The weights respondents put on such measures can serve
as a benchmark against which we can compare measures from our first five classes.14
After compiling an initial list, we revised it according to several criteria. To make its
length more manageable, we combined similar items into single measures (but we preserved
commonly-used survey questions close to their original form). To reduce subject confusion and
response error, we oriented all items so that rating higher would conventionally be considered
desirable; for example, “not feeling anxious.” We further edited items in order to use vocabulary
that would be understandable by most respondents in a national sample.
The final list of 136 aspects includes 113 “private good” aspects—relating to an
individual’s own well-being (e.g., “your health”)—and 23 “public good” aspects (also labeled
public-aspects)—relating to an entire society’s well-being (e.g., “equality of opportunity in your
nation”). Among the private-good aspects, we distinguish between what we label you-aspects—
108 that pertain to the respondent but could in principle pertain to everyone (e.g., “your
health”)—and you-only-aspects—5 that pertain to the respondent and could not meaningfully
and distinctly pertain to everyone at the same time, for example due to their being inherently
relative (e.g., “your social status”).
Finally, from each of the 108 you-aspects we constructed two additional aspect versions:
an everyone-aspect that pertains to everyone in a nation (e.g., by replacing “your health” with
“people’s health”); and an others-aspect that pertains to typical others (e.g., “others’ health”). In
the next section, we explain the purpose of those aspect versions and discuss them further.

III. Survey Design
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In principle, we could have additionally included receipt of different amounts of money as an aspect on
our list. Doing so would have allowed us to scale the estimated marginal utilities of the non-money
aspects, converting them to dollar units, in turn enabling one to sum equivalent variation across
individuals. In practice, however, this approach would have significantly complicated our current
(purposefully simplified, proof-of-concept) survey design. For example, dollar amounts would require
their own quantitative scales that could not be made easily comparable to the rating scales of all other
aspects without considerable design changes (see the discussion in III.C below).
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The core of our online SP survey consists of 30 hypothetical-choice scenarios, one per
screen. They are preceded by a screen of detailed instructions and followed by a multi-screen
exit questionnaire.

III.A. Scenario Screens
An example scenario, as it appears on the screen, was reproduced in the Introduction.
Each such screen has three components. First, the preamble frames the scenario as a choice
between two options, neutrally labeled “Option 1” and “Option 2,” that have different
consequences over the next four years. Second, the aspect table describes the difference in
consequences between the two options. Finally, the choice question elicits a participant’s stated
preference between the two options.
Preamble. The preamble appears in one of two versions. The first version (reproduced in
the Introduction) introduces personal-choice scenarios. Since much of the discourse regarding
SWB surveys is focused on private-good aspects, personal choice seems the relevant setting for
eliciting these aspects’ weights through respondents’ pairwise decisions that trade them off.
The second preamble version introduces policy-vote scenarios: the opening clause
“Imagine you are making a personal decision” is replaced with the clause “Imagine that you
and everyone else in your nation are voting on a national policy issue.”15 Policy-vote scenarios
have two purposes. First, as with standard public goods, our 23 public-aspects cannot typically
be affected by one individual’s personal choice—but are routinely traded off in policy-vote
contexts. Second, even for you-aspects, if a national SWB survey is to be used for evaluating
policy, it may be useful to elicit the relative weights also in a setup where the aspects pertain to
everyone (and are traded off by policy in the same way for everyone). Due to other-regarding
preferences, for example, these everyone-weights could differ from their corresponding youweights elicited in personal-choice scenarios. While our empirical effort is focused on personal
scenarios, we also explore such personal-vs.-policy comparisons below.
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We chose this voting frame for two reasons. First, it is designed to imitate a situation that, while
hypothetical, is as close as possible to the policy choice setup people have real-world experience with;
while most people are never in a position to actually choose a policy that would get implemented, people
often face choices over real policies in the voting booth. Second, the frame is designed to elicit
participants’ own preferences. While these preferences might well incorporate a concern for others, we
did not want the choices to put extra weight on others out of concern that these others would be left out of
the decision-making process. For this reason the question explicitly states that “you and everyone else in
your nation” are voting.
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The rest of the preamble is identical across all scenarios. Designed to elicit participants’
“single-period” utility, it explicitly limits the duration of the predicted difference between the
options. While four years is a somewhat arbitrary duration, it does not seem unreasonable as a
time frame for assessing policy (for example, it is the length of the term of the U.S. President) as
well as personal choices. The preamble ends with a sentence that effectively asks participants to
imagine that anything not explicitly stated to differ is held constant.
Aspect table. Each row of the aspect table compares the two options in terms of one
aspect, with an “X” positioned to indicate that either Option 1 or 2 rates “much higher,”
“somewhat higher,” or “slightly higher” on that aspect. The “about equal” column in the middle
never contains an “X”; it serves as a reminder to participants that unlisted aspects are to be
considered as affected equally by the two options.
Personal scenarios draw aspects randomly from the set of 113 private aspects (which
consists of 108 you- and 5 you-only-aspects). The policy scenarios we analyze in this paper
instead draw aspects randomly from the set of 108 everyone- and 23 public-aspects; these 131
aspects are effectively public goods because they affect everyone in the same way. Each
respondent faces, in random order, 11 personal scenarios, 5 of these policy scenarios, and 14
additional exploratory versions of policy scenarios that we do not analyze in this paper.16
The number of aspects (or rows) in a scenario’s aspect table is randomly drawn from the
set {2, 3, 4, 6}. While a shorter table may be easier for respondents to read and think through, a
longer one improves statistical power for identifying marginal utilities.
The rating of each aspect—i.e., the location of the “X” in each row—is randomly drawn
from the six feasible ratings. However, we place two restrictions on the combination of ratings
within a scenario. First, scenarios with an even number of aspects must be balanced: exactly half
of the aspects favor Option 1 and exactly half favor Option 2. Second, scenarios with 4 or 6
aspects must additionally be symmetric: each rating in favor of Option 1—i.e., “much higher,”
“somewhat higher,” or “slightly higher”—is matched by a rating of the same intensity in favor of
Option 2 on another aspect.17
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These additional versions are designed to explore issues related to other-regarding preferences that are
beyond the scope of this paper. (For example, to what extent do people’s votes on policy reflect their
willingness to sacrifice their own utility for increasing others’?) These policy scenario versions draw
aspects from sets that consist of different combinations of you-, you-only-, others-, and public-aspects.
17
We require 2-aspect scenarios to be balanced because, otherwise, half of them are expected to elicit a
trivial choice, as one of the options would rank higher on all aspects. By placing no restrictions on 317

Choice question. The choice response scale is identical across all scenarios. It is designed
to elicit intensity of preference on a six-point scale (“Much prefer Option 1,” “Somewhat prefer
Option 1,” “Slightly prefer Option 1,” “Slightly prefer Option 2,” etc.). To discourage “lazy”
responses, we omitted an “indifferent” option; our “slightly” options are intended to allow for
nearly-indifferent choices.

III.B. Instructions and Questionnaire
The instructions screen is reproduced in the Web Appendix. Respondents could re-open it
from every scenario screen by clicking a hyperlink. It includes an example aspect table that is
more complex than that shown in the Introduction, illustrating and explaining more possibilities.
The instructions emphasize a number of scenario design points, including: the distinctions
between personal-choice and policy-vote scenarios; that the two options differ only on the
consequences listed in the aspect table; and that “The items and their rankings in the tables are
randomly chosen by the computer so that we [the researchers] learn as much as possible from
your choices.”18
In addition, the instructions explain that in each row of the aspect tables, one word is
emphasized in boldface type (in the example in the Introduction, you and your). Participants are
asked to “pay careful attention to the emphasized words, and interpret a consequence with the
following emphasized words as affecting the following people:”19

aspect scenarios, we allow such trivial cases to occur (with 25% probability), and we use them as a
secondary robustness check to identify respondents who might have answered at random (see footnote 29
below). Finally, we require 4- and 6-aspect scenarios to be balanced and symmetric because our pre-tests
suggested that otherwise, participants faced with these longer scenarios may adopt “visual shortcut”
heuristics—such as choosing an option that ranks better on most aspects—and pay less attention to the
identities of the aspects. We compare results estimated separately from 2-, 3-, 4-, and 6-aspect scenarios
in section V and in the Web Appendix.
18
This randomization disclosure is intended to prevent respondents from perceiving random combinations
of aspects as reflecting an intentional design decision to construct a particular scenario. Such mistaken
inferences could give rise to undesired experimenter-demand effects.
19
We included the bolding and this “legend” (reproduced here as it appears on the screen) because pretests without the bolding indicated that participants might quickly skim the aspect tables, mistakenly
assuming that, for example, all aspects apply to only them personally. The bolding scheme allows us to
keep the aspects short and simple and at the same time visually clear and coherent. The legend provides
respondents with a quick reference that clarifies the bolded words’ intended meaning.
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Once participants complete the scenarios, they fill out an exit questionnaire. We ask
participants, in both a multiple-choice question and an open-ended question, whether they
understood what we were asking them to do (in the multiple choice, 92.5% answered “always”
or “mostly”; 7.5% answered “not really”). We also ask basic demographic questions, as well as
questions about ideology, political party affiliation, and religiosity.

III.C. Design versus Theory
As discussed above, our SP survey is intended as a first-pass demonstration of feasibility.
As such, it is a considerably simplified version of the theory-based ideal that should guide
governments as they design their surveys. We now briefly describe what a theoretically ideal
survey might involve, and we highlight a few key deviations of our SP survey from that ideal.
In an ideal application of our theory, a SP-survey component would follow a SWBsurvey component in a single, combined survey. The SWB component would elicit a
respondent’s current aspect levels (i.e., her w). Each of the J fundamental-aspect questions would
have its own scale: while a subjective scale with verbal labels may be a natural choice for some
aspects, for other aspects it may be possible to use an objective scale with quantitative units.
After respondents report their current w in the SWB-survey component, the SP component would
elicit their choices between pairs of options, where each option involves a small change from the
current w; these small changes would be spelled out using each aspect’s own units. With
sufficiently many such choices, each respondent’s vector of marginal utilities could then be
estimated.
Our SP survey deviates from this ideal in a number of ways. First, it is a stand-alone
survey, rather than the second component in a combined SWB+SP survey. We concentrate our
efforts on a stand-alone SP survey since SWB surveys are already conducted routinely and do
not require a demonstration of feasibility. Second, our survey uses verbal, relative rating scales
that are identical for all aspects (“much,” “somewhat,” and “slightly higher”) rather than stating
differences using each aspect’s own units. We do this to simplify and streamline the survey and
its instructions. It also allows us to interpret relative marginal-utility estimates as informative
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regarding aspects’ relative “importance” because the aspect ratings are put in units that are
arguably comparable, namely respondents’ judgment of what constitutes “slightly,” “somewhat,”
or “much” more of the aspect (but see VI.B for discussion of how, with additional data, aspects
could be compared in terms of predictive power for the index). Third, our survey elicits few SP
questions from each respondent, and in our marginal utility estimates below we pool the data
across respondents. Doing so keeps the survey short—a crucial feature given our convenience
sample—but theoretically would only be justified if respondents not only use the scales the same
way but also have the same local slopes of indifference surfaces. We return to this last point in
section VI.C.

IV. Empirical Results: Marginal Utility Estimates
Our SP-survey respondents were recruited during December 2011 by Clear Voice
Research, a private firm that invites individuals to “start sharing their voice” and “make a little
money” by participating in online surveys. We aimed at a sample that, although not a random
sample, would resemble the adult (20+) U.S. population on the demographics listed in table 1.

IV.A. Respondent Demographics
Table 1 reports the demographic distribution of the 7,391 respondents who began our
survey (the “All” column); the 5,397 who completed it (“Completes”); and the 4,608 included in
our main analysis below (“Primary Sample”).20 This primary sample excludes respondents who
completed the survey in less than eight minutes; our robustness analysis in section V below
suggests that including them does not affect our results qualitatively but increases measurement
error. The table shows that the three groups are similar on observables.
The rightmost column reports figures from the 2010 American Community Survey, 2010
Census, and 2011 Current Population Survey (see Web Appendix for details). Relative to the
U.S. population, our respondents are more likely to be married, college-educated, and white, and
less likely to have very high income, be Hispanic, and live alone. Our respondents may of course
also differ on unobservables.
20

Due to a programming error, the first 1,936 primary-sample respondents faced scenarios in which
aspects were unintentionally drawn from only 108 of the intended 113 personal and 131 policy aspects.
As a result, we have more data—and tighter estimates—on some aspects. Excluding these 1,936 early
respondents has very little effect on our main estimates (see Web Appendix table WA1).
20

IV.B. Personal Choices: Benchmark Specification and Results
Our main results are reported in the “Personal” panel of table 2. Recall from section III
that each respondent faced eleven personal scenarios where the two choice options differ on 2, 3,
4, or 6 of the 113 personal aspects. Pooling all such scenarios across all respondents, we report
results from the following OLS regression:
(3)

StatedPreference

AspectRatings ∙

.

Each observation s captures the information from a single scenario faced by a respondent,
corresponding to a single survey screen like the example in the Introduction. StatedPreference
encodes the response to the choice question. AspectRatingss , a 113-element vector, encodes the
differences between the two options; all of its entries are 0 except for the 2–6 entries representing
the aspects on which the options differ. We cluster standard errors at the respondent level.
To the six points on the choice scale (“Much prefer Option 1,” etc.) we assign the six
numerical values (-1, -0.47, -0.14, +0.14, +0.47, +1), and to the seven columns in the aspects
table (“Option 1 much higher,” etc.) we assign the values (-1, -0.83, -0.75, 0, +0.75, +0.83, +1).
As described in section V below, these numerical values were estimated from the data using a
nonlinear ordered probit model, constraining the scales to be symmetric (to economize on
parameters) and range from -1 to +1. While we prefer using these estimated scales,
misspecifying the scales should have little effect on the estimated aspect coefficients relative to
each other. Indeed, as reported in the Web Appendix, for the personal scenarios, the correlation
between the coefficients reported in table 2 and those estimated with linear codings (i.e., choice
scale: (-3, -2, -1, +1, +2, +3) and aspect ratings: (-3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3)) is 0.998. We find
similarly high correlations (0.99) with coefficients estimated from a probit or logit model where
we collapse the choice scale to a binary variable (prefer Option 1 vs. Option 2) and use the
estimated scales for the aspect columns.
Here we report OLS for maximum transparency, and for simplicity we assume for now
that respondents are identical in both their marginal rates of substitution and their use of the
response scale. As reported in section V below, our results are essentially unaffected when we
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relax many of the restrictions imposed by this specification. We provide some evidence on
heterogeneity across respondent subpopulations later in this section.
We interpret the regression (3) as estimating equation (2), where in our empirical
analysis, Δw is the difference in aspect ratings across the two options in a scenario. The  vector
estimates a vector proportional to

, and s captures response error. We interpret , which

we estimate to be –0.02 (s.e. = 0.003), as picking up a very small respondent bias in favor of
“Option 1” despite the fact that the content of the two options is randomly drawn from the same
distribution.
The Personal panel in the table reports, for each of the 113 aspect regressors, its
coefficient and standard error. The “Rank” column orders the you-aspects by coefficient size (1–
108) and, additionally, places the 5 you-only-aspects relative to these by assigning to them rank
numbers with letter suffixes (e.g., “74a” lies between 74 and 75).21 Since the independent and
dependent variables are coded over ranges of the same length (–1 to +1), a coefficient of, for
example, +0.46 means that on average, changing the relevant aspect from the extreme rating
“Option 1 much higher” to the other extreme of “Option 2 much higher” causes choice to move
46% of the entire choice scale in the same direction.
Figure 2 summarizes the coefficient and rank information in table 2 graphically, for the
113 personal aspects (x’s) and the 131 policy aspects (triangles; we discuss these below), sorted
by their respective within-panel rank. Of the 113 personal aspects, all but two are positive,
almost all statistically significantly so. This confirms that, as intended by our wording of the
aspects, an option rating higher on an aspect is, ceteris paribus, generally considered preferable.
(We discuss the two coefficients that are negative below.) The table and the figure show that the
greatest variation in coefficient size across aspects occurs among those at the top (for example,
the top 10 coefficients range from +0.46 to +0.32), and at the bottom (the bottom 10 range from
+0.09 to –0.09); coefficients vary more slowly among middle-ranking aspects. The standard
errors on the coefficients are typically below 0.017. These features of our estimates should be
borne in mind when reading our discussion below, which focuses on ranks.
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This ranking scheme facilitates comparing the 108 you-aspect ranks with their corresponding 108
everyone-aspect ranks in the “Policy” panel, accommodating the fact that the you-only-aspects do not
have counterparts in policy scenarios (and, similarly, that the public-aspects do not have counterparts in
the “Personal” panel).
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Looking at specific aspects, those involving family (well-being [rank 1], happiness [2],
and relationship quality [5]); health (general [3] and mental [7]); security (financial [6], about
life and the future [8], and physical [21]); values (morality [4] and meaning [10]); and options
(freedom of choice [9] and resources [12]) are conspicuous in their predominance at the top of
the table, along with—reassuringly—some measures of happiness and life satisfaction (these are
discussed below). In contrast, at the very bottom of the table, we find all four you-only aspects
that involve relative position—power over other people [108c], social status [108b], high relative
income [108a], and postmortem fame [106a]—with coefficients that are either negative or close
to zero.22 Since much evidence seems to imply a high marginal utility to status and relative
position (see Heffetz and Frank, 2011, for a survey), we conjecture that the low ranks of these
aspects may reflect respondents’ answering our stated-preference question in terms of their metapreferences or laundered preferences.23
While as noted above we do not view the potential for meta- or laundered preference
elicitation as necessarily a disadvantage, our estimates may also be sensitive to specific details of
our survey design and the underlying respondent population. Later in this section, the next
section, and the Web Appendix, we compare estimates based on alternative design details and on
alternative subpopulations. Since our general method is held fixed, however, we can only
speculate on its effect on our results. The deliberative frame of mind induced by our setup may
make evaluative SWB aspects easier for respondents to consider than affective aspects; the
double-negative framing of negative emotions may make them harder to think about than
positive emotions; and the instruction to hold other aspects constant is almost certainly more
difficult to follow when broader, combination aspects are varied in a scenario than when only
narrow, fundamental aspects are varied. To the extent that our fixed design choices amplify
estimated coefficients on some categories of aspects relative to others, comparisons of aspects
within an aspect category may be more generalizable to alternative design choices than
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The fifth you-only-aspect is non-positional: “the happiness of your friends” [74a]. At the same time,
two of the other aspects at the bottom—“your enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing challenges”
[108] and, to a lesser extent, a “ladder” aspect modeled after Cantril’s Self-Anchoring Scale [103]—could
have been interpreted by respondents as involving relative position, although we did not perceive them
that way when compiling our aspect list. Indeed, we expected the ladder aspect to rank high, along with
other evaluative SWB measures (see IV.C below).
23
Another possibility is that the low rank of these aspects reflects experimenter-demand effects. While we
cannot rule out this concern, we believe it is less likely in an anonymous web-survey like ours.
23

comparisons across categories. These caveats should be borne in mind throughout our discussion
below.

IV.C. Personal Choices: Discussion
Evaluative and affective SWB. Among happiness and life satisfaction measures, the more
evaluative ones—family happiness24 [2] and life satisfaction [11]—are among the highestranking aspects, and rank higher than the more affective ones—“how much of the time you feel
happy” [31] and “how happy you feel” [39]. Other measures that past work has classified as
positive affect measures, such as “how often you smile or laugh” [35] (e.g., Kahneman and
Deaton, 2010), rank similarly to these affective happiness measures.
Negative emotions. Recently, Deaton et al. (2011) suggest that national SWB surveys
focus also on measuring negative emotions. In our data, the six measures they recommend (in
their “rough order of preference”) get the following ranks: pain [49], stress [45], worry [52],
anger [76], tired (not on our list, but we have: feeling full of energy [42] and quality of sleep
[77]), and sad [64]. This group of measures lies in the middle of our table, with coefficients in
the range 0.19–0.25. Other negative emotions, such as frustration [67], are also in this range. Of
particular interest because it is the only negative emotion among the four U.K. questions from
the Introduction, anxious [92] lies somewhat below this range; its coefficient (0.13) is roughly
half the coefficients of stress (0.25) and pain (0.24).
Eudaimonic SWB. While evaluative and affective measures dominate the policy discourse
on national SWB surveys, researchers increasingly recognize the importance of eudaimonic
dimensions of well-being. In our data, eudaimonic aspects such as being a good, moral person
and living according to personal values [4] (coeff. 0.40) and having a life that is meaningful and
has value [10] (coeff. 0.32) indeed rank among the highest aspects. The aspect modeled after the
only eudaimonic question in the U.K. four—feeling that the things you do in your life are
worthwhile [20]—has a reasonably high coefficient (0.28), yet lower than the two above.
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If our respondents interpret our family happiness aspect [rank 2] as including self, then it is more
inclusive than typical happiness measures (that refer only to self). As a result, we do not know if its place
at the top of the table is due to it being a relatively evaluative happiness measure or to its inclusion of
family. (We view this aspect as a relatively evaluative measure since reporting one’s family happiness is
likely to require more evaluative effort than reporting about one’s own emotions.)
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In summary, our agnostic, stated-preference-based approach yields high marginal utility
estimates on measures—such as life satisfaction—that have been at the center of the discussion
about well-being indices. At the same time, other measures that have received recent attention—
such as those of positive and negative affect, and certain eudaimonic measures—have
coefficients that are not as high as aspects that have received less attention in this context, in
particular, about family, health, security, values, and options. The two measures with the largest
coefficients—“the overall well-being of you and your family” and “the happiness of your
family”—are, as far as we know, survey questions we invented that have not previously been
asked in large-scale surveys. Our results suggest they deserve attention in future data collection
efforts.25

IV.D. Policy Choices
The “Policy” panel of table 2 reports estimates from a specification identical to that used
in the Personal panel but uses data from the five policy scenarios each respondent faced. Recall
that in such scenarios, respondents vote on policy, trading off 131 aspects that include everyoneaspects (personal aspects that pertain to everyone in the nation) and public-aspects (public goods
that pertain to the entire nation or, when stated, to the entire world). To make the coefficient
magnitudes comparable across the two panels, we use the same numerical scales as in the
personal regression (rather than re-estimating them). As mentioned above, to further facilitate
such comparison between the you-aspects and their corresponding everyone-aspects, the “Rank”
column ranks the everyone-aspects by coefficient size (1–108) and, in addition, places the 23
public-aspects relative to these by assigning to them rank numbers with letter suffixes.
Since we collected less data in these policy scenarios than in personal scenarios, standard
errors are larger, typically in the 0.023–0.035 range. Nonetheless, the correlation between the
108 you- and everyone-coefficient pairs is fairly high (0.81).26 Figure 3 conveys the comparison
graphically by replicating figure 2 for only the 108 you- and 108 everyone-aspects, both sorted
by the rank of the you-aspects in the personal scenarios. The dashed curve reports a locally-
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For example, to capture our overall top-ranked aspect, surveys could ask: “On a scale from 0 to 10, how
would you rate the overall well-being of you and your family?”
26
Here and later, we report the correlation between two vectors of estimated (sample) coefficients. Due to
sampling error, this reported correlation is a lower bound on the correlation between the vectors of true
(population) coefficients.
25

weighted linear regression of the everyone-coefficients (triangles). The figure suggests that on
average, everyone-coefficients in the policy scenarios are attenuated versions of their counterpart
you-coefficients in the personal scenarios. This may reflect respondents’ greater uncertainty
regarding others’ preferences, perhaps causing respondents to state preferences with weaker
intensity in policy scenarios (though remember that coefficient ratios are what matter for the
index).
Consistent with the high correlation, some of the high-ranking you-aspects retain their
high rank as everyone-aspects. These include overall well-being of you and your family
[personal rank 1; policy rank 3], health [3; 6], personal values [4; 2], and financial security [6; 8].
At the same time, aspects related to freedom and to avoiding abuse seem to rank higher as policy
aspects. These include the freedom to choose [9; 1]; your ability to pursue your dreams [36; 14];
being treated with dignity [26; 11]; and, among double negatives, avoiding deception [23; 5],
pain [49; 10], and emotional abuse [68; 16].
Perhaps most importantly, several of the 23 public-aspects (included in the policy but not
the personal scenarios) have among the largest coefficients. These include freedom from
corruption, injustice, and abuse of power [0a] (coeff. 0.39), society helping those who struggle
[5a], the morality of other people [5b], freedom of speech and of political participation [6a], and
the well-being of the people in your nation [6b].27 High coefficients on freedom from corruption
and freedom of speech seem consistent with the tendency for respondents to weight heavily, in a
policy context, aspects that expand individuals’ choice sets—reducing the need to choose
specific outcomes for others. We interpret these findings as providing empirical evidence that
when making a policy choice, our respondents put high value on capabilities (Sen, 1985) and
basic rights (Rawls, 1971).
Finally, we discuss “objective” aspects, some of which are modeled after widely-used
indicators. As discussed above, some of these aspects have large coefficients, including freedom
from corruption, injustice, and abuse of power; financial security; health; and freedom of speech
and of political participation. But among standard macroeconomic indicators, only low
unemployment [18a] has a relatively high rank. Others have lower ranks: low inflation [43a],
GDP growth [57a], GDP per capita [61a], and GDP [88a]. The tendency to prefer aspects that
27

Note that the public-aspect “the well-being of people in your nation” [6b] is quite similar to the
everyone-aspect “the well-being of people and their families” [3]. The higher rank of the latter is
consistent with the idea that highlighting “families” may raise the perceived importance of an aspect.
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increase the choice set (rather than focusing exclusively on outcomes) may help explain why,
among the “objective” aspects, the coefficient on equality of opportunity [19b] is relatively large
(0.24), larger, for example, than that on equality of income [66a] (0.16).

IV.E. Cross-Group Heterogeneity
To provide some evidence on cross-group differences in marginal utilities, we produced
versions of table 2 for subpopulations of our respondents. Web Appendix tables WA2–WA6
report coefficients, respectively, for men and women; those above and below an income of
$50,000/year; liberals, moderates and conservatives; those who do and do not attend religious
services at least monthly; and those younger and older than 45. The tables allow for many
comparisons and tests; here we briefly summarize only some of the main findings that emerge.
Overall, aspects in the personal scenarios rank similarly across the subpopulations we
examine. The sets of 113 coefficients are highly correlated across pairs of disjoint groups, with
correlations ranging from 0.86 (liberals vs. moderates) to 0.91 (men vs. women). Moreover,
there seems to be a broad consensus across the subpopulations that the highest-ranking aspects
include those related to family, health, and security.
To explore which aspects’ coefficients change most dramatically across groups, we first
normalize our marginal utility estimates to comparable units across groups by dividing each
group’s set of 113 coefficients by its mean (effectively treating the “average aspect” as
numeraire); we then examine, for each aspect and each pair of disjoint groups, the ratio of the
two normalized coefficients, dividing the smaller coefficient by the larger (so all ratios are ≤ 1).
Tables WA2–WA6 report these ratios. We highlight here aspects that rank in the top ten in one
group but drop sufficiently in the complementary group to yield a ratio of less than 0.8. We
caution that not only our estimates in table 2, but also these cross-group differences, may not
generalize to a more representative sample (cf., Heffetz and Rabin, 2012).
Men rank higher: “your sense that your life is meaningful and has value” [men rank 5,
women rank 29, normalized coefficient ratio (cr) = 0.77]. Women rank higher: “your mental
health and emotional stability” [women 6, men 23, cr = 0.71].
High-income rank higher: life satisfaction [high income 5, low income 41, cr = 0.70],
and having a meaningful life [high 7, low 24, cr = 0.75].
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Liberals rank higher: having enough time and money [liberals 4, conservatives 30, cr =
0.78]. Conservatives rank higher: being a good, moral person and living according to personal
values [co. 4, li. 6, cr = 0.75], family happiness [co. 1, li. 3, cr = 0.75], and family relationships
[co. 5, li. 9, cr = 0.77].
More religious rank higher: sense of purpose [more religious 9, less religious 72, cr =
0.60], having people around you who share your values, beliefs and interests [more 10, less 60,
cr = 0.69], feeling grateful [more 8, less 50, cr = 0.74], being good and moral [more 2, less 7, cr
= 0.74], and making a difference and making the world a better place [more 7, less 35, cr =
0.76]. Less religious rank higher: life satisfaction [less 9, more 36, cr = 0.77].
Older rank higher: having many options and possibilities in life and the freedom to
choose among them [older 5, younger 35, cr = 0.65].
In policy scenarios, correlations between pairs of sets of the 131 coefficients are lower—
although still reasonably high—and range from 0.60 (liberals vs. conservatives) to 0.81 (more vs.
less religious). Using the same method as above, all ratios are reported in tables WA2–WA6.
Here we highlight aspects with normalized ratios below 0.6. Women rank higher: “people being
good, moral people…” [women 1, men 35, cr = 0.50]. Men rank higher: “people getting the
rewards and punishments they deserve” [men 5, women 75, cr = 0.58]. Liberals rank higher: the
condition of animals, nature, and the environment [li. 1, co. 113, cr = 0.27]. Conservatives rank
higher: “people’s ability to have and raise children” [co. 8, li. 111, cr = 0.33]. Older rank higher:
being treated with dignity and respect [older 6, younger 76, cr = 0.53].

V. Robustness and Additional Results
In the previous section we reported results: from (i) a simple OLS specification;
including (ii) our entire personal and policy aspect lists; and pooling responses (iii) across
scenarios with different numbers of aspects, (iv) across all but the speediest-to-answer
respondents, and (v) across scenarios faced earlier and later in the survey. In this section, we
briefly revisit these points, summarizing analyses reported in more detail in the Web Appendix.
(i) Econometric Specification: In our OLS specification we coded the verbal scales of the
independent and dependent variables as exogenously imposed numeric scales. These were
estimated from the following nonlinear ordered probit specification:
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StatedPreference . Results are reported in Web Appendix table WA7.

Note that specification (4) normalizes “much” to be –1 or +1 depending on whether it
favors Option 1 or Option 2, and the numerical values for “slightly” and “somewhat” used for
the OLS specification in section IV are
(i.e., the values of

slightly

and

somewhat )

slightly

and

somewhat .

The resulting aspects-rating scale

is determined by the extent to which the verbal labels

affect choice differently, which in turn depends on a combination of three factors: (a)
respondents’ quantitative interpretations of the verbal labels (namely, the magnitudes on the xaxis that correspond to “slightly” and “somewhat,” given that “much” is normalized to 1); (b)
higher derivatives of utility, averaged across the aspects (i.e., how utility on the y-axis depends
on the x-axis magnitudes); and (c) any “focusing effect,” that is, respondents paying less
attention to an aspect’s rating than to its direction in favor of one of the options.
To obtain values for the choice scale in the OLS specification, we use the standard
normal cdf to calculate the expected value of latent preference intensity conditional on observed
preference-intensity category; linearly rescale these conditional expectations to lie in the (–1, +1)
interval; and symmetrize them around zero by taking the average of the absolute value of each
pair of corresponding conditional expectations. The resulting choice scale captures respondents’
quantitative interpretations of the verbal choice labels.
Not surprisingly, since the numerical scales in the OLS regressions reported in section IV
are estimated from the nonlinear ordered probit, the correlations between the 113 personal ’s
across tables 2 and WA7, as well as between the 131 policy ’s across the tables, are virtually 1.
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As an alternative, re-estimating the OLS regressions in table 2 using linear scales as described in
section IV.B yields personal and policy coefficients (table WA8) whose correlations with those
in table 2 are above 0.99. As a variant that allows respondents to differ in their interpretation of
the choice intensities, we first normalize the choice scale at the respondent level by stretching the
linear scale so that the variance across each respondent’s 30 choices is 1, and only then estimate
the OLS (table WA8). The correlations between the coefficients estimated with and without this
normalization are at least 0.98. For probit and logit models, see table WA9.
(ii) Fundamental and Combination Aspects: If a combination and a fundamental aspect
appear in the same scenario, then the presence of the combination aspect might affect
respondents’ interpretation of the fundamental aspect. For example, if “the overall well-being of
you and your family” is a function of “your family’s happiness,” then a respondent asked to trade
them off might—contrary to our intention—interpret the former as meaning overall well-being
exclusive of family happiness. Depending on the prevalence of such situations and on how
respondents interpret them, our estimated coefficients might be biased.
To probe the robustness of our results to this potential concern, we re-estimate our
benchmark OLS model leaving out scenarios containing aspects that seem most likely to be
functions of other aspects on our list. For example, for personal choices we exclude all aspects
that we view as evaluative SWB measures—including both commonly used ones (e.g., life
satisfaction) and our novel proposals (e.g., how desirable your life is).28 The estimated
coefficients on the 94 remaining aspects (table WA10) are broadly similar to those reported in
table 2 (correlation 0.99). Results are similar in other specifications, for example, excluding the
macroeconomic indicators in policy vote scenarios (table WA11).
(iii) Number of Aspects per Scenario: As explained in section III.A, respondents face 2-,
3-, 4-, and 6-aspect scenarios. Re-estimating our OLS model separately for each of these four
scenario designs, we find that the range of coefficient sizes roughly halves from 2- to 6-aspect
scenarios. The correlations between the four sets of 113 and of 131 coefficients range from 0.84
to 0.92 in personal and from 0.52 to 0.70 in policy scenarios (but note that the latter are more
attenuated because the policy coefficients’ estimation errors are larger). We also examine, for
each pair of coefficient sets, the intercept of the SD line (the line going through the mean of the
28

As our data and code are available on the journal’s and our websites, an interested reader can readily reestimate our model using her or his preferred subset of aspects.
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sets whose slope is the ratio of standard deviations). If one set were identical to another up to a
multiplicative scalar—i.e., the two sets implied identical marginal rates of substitution—the
intercept would be zero. We find that the intercepts are close to zero, ranging from –0.04 to 0.15
in personal and from –0.10 to 0.10 in policy scenarios. Our general conclusion is that while
respondents allow each aspect to influence their stated preference less intensely per aspect when
the number of aspects is larger, relative coefficient size remains rather stable in personal
scenarios and somewhat stable in policy scenarios. Further details are provided in table WA12
and in figure WA1.
(iv) Respondents’ Effort and Comprehension: Respondents may exert little effort on
unincentivized surveys. This may bias the estimated coefficients away from the true marginal
utilities, for example by “compressing” aspects’ coefficients toward each other if respondents
pay less attention to each aspect’s identity, or by biasing coefficients toward zero if respondents
answer randomly. Using amount of time to complete the survey as a proxy for effort level, and
re-estimating our main OLS specification separately by approximate sextiles (table WA13), we
indeed find that the coefficients of the speediest sextile (less than 8 minutes) are severely
attenuated relative to other sextiles’ coefficients. Outside the speediest sextile, coefficient sizes
seem to increase with completion-time sextile less steeply and then peak at the second-slowest
sextile (21–31 minutes). Furthermore, the correlations between the personal coefficients of the
speediest sextile and of other sextiles range from 0.23 to 0.32, much lower than the correlations
between pairs of other sextiles’ coefficient sets, which range from 0.76 to 0.89. For these
reasons, our benchmark OLS specification reported in table 2 excludes respondents who took
less than 8 minutes to complete the survey.29 Further excluding those who reported in the exit
questionnaire that they did “not really” understand what they were asked to do (see III.B above)
yields virtually identical estimates (table WA15).
(v) Early vs. Late Scenarios: Responses made later in the survey may be less reliable due
to tiredness or boredom. Alternatively, they may be more reliable due to practice. Also,
respondents’ interpretations of particular aspects may change over the course of the survey. For
29

As an additional respondent-effort sensitivity check, we examine respondents who, in at least one threeaspect scenario where one option happens to rate higher on all three aspects, choose the other option. The
rankings of aspects in this sample are similar to our benchmark, but the coefficients are greatly attenuated
(see table WA14). We like this sensitivity check less because it may fail to drop random responders (who
choose the higher-rated option by chance) and, at the same time, may unduly drop respondents who prefer
less of certain aspects.
31

example, respondents may interpret life satisfaction as a broad SWB measure early on, but as
they face new examples of affective SWB measures, they may interpret it to exclude feelings.
To assess these possibilities, we estimate an augmented version of our OLS specification
by including a dummy for whether a scenario appeared in the earlier half of the survey and
interacting it with each aspect’s rating (table WA16). We find no evidence of systematic
differences between estimates from scenarios in earlier and later halves of the survey.

VI. Pragmatics
We now return to the two practical issues we posed in the Introduction: which questions
should a SWB survey ask, and how should the responses be weighted? In theory, the well-being
index formula, ∑

, provides clear solutions: ask about the levels of each of the J

fundamental aspects comprising w, and weight the responses by their marginal utilities. In
practice, as we have emphasized throughout, both our proposed list of fundamental aspects and
our marginal-utility estimates are only first-pass proofs-of-concept in need of further
development.
In conjunction with making progress on those fronts, governments that wish to construct
reliable well-being indices will have to overcome additional challenges that we have deferred
until now. In this section we return to these challenges and outline directions for surmounting
them.

VI.A. Overlapping Questions
In our theory in section I, preferences are defined over a vector w of fundamental aspects.
While further progress on extending our list of survey questions may eventually result in an
exhaustive list that includes all the components of w (as required by the theory), it would likely
also further increase the incidence of conceptually overlapping questions (which the theory
assumes away). Note that conceptual overlap between questions is different from empirical
covariance (e.g., in the time series) between questions: while overlap exists when two or more
questions refer, by the meaning of the language they use, to some of the same fundamental
aspects (an extreme example: two questions that are perfectly synonymous), covariance between
questions is a feature of the empirical joint distribution of aspect levels (an extreme example:
two conceptually distinct measures A and B that are perfectly correlated, say, due to A causing
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B). Hence non-zero covariances are likely even in the absence of overlap, and information
regarding covariances across SWB survey waves (or across respondents) is not sufficient for
identifying overlap.
Intuitively, including overlapping questions in the well-being index would lead to doublecounting, a problem analogous to counting some components of GDP more than once. Hence,
before a reliable well-being index can be constructed, a strategy is needed for avoiding doublecounting. One such strategy is to find a list of SWB questions free from overlap by eliminating
questions that overlap with other questions on the list. Doing so requires a method for detecting
overlap between any given pair of SWB survey questions. This subsection briefly outlines the
basic idea underlying one such method; we provide an extended discussion, a fully specified
concrete example, and a formal treatment in the Web Appendix.
The idea behind our overlap-detection method is to use a variation on our SP survey in
order to compare the (relative) marginal utility of the joint increase in two survey questions
(appearing within a single scenario option) with the sum of the (relative) marginal utilities of the
separate increases of the two survey questions (appearing in two separate scenarios). For
example, consider two of the U.K. questions from the Introduction: life satisfaction and life
worthwhileness. If the two questions do not overlap—that is, if they elicit two fundamental
aspects or, more generally, two functions of disjoint sets of fundamental aspects—then the sum
of the marginal utility of life satisfaction plus the marginal utility of life worthwhileness (both
relative, say, to the marginal utility of health) would equal the (relative to health) marginal utility
of a joint increase in life satisfaction and life worthwhileness. This equality holds approximately
even if the aspects measured by the two questions enter preferences as complements, as long as
the increases are small. On the other hand, if the two questions do overlap, then the marginal
utility of their joint increase would be smaller than the sum of marginal utilities of their separate
increases because part of the joint increase is overlapping and is taken into account by survey
respondents only once.
Therefore, to identify overlap between, e.g., life satisfaction and life worthwhileness, in
the Web Appendix we propose to measure these (relative) marginal utilities by collecting data
from (a) two-aspect scenarios where respondents choose between different increases in life
satisfaction in Option 1 versus increases in a third aspect in Option 2; (b) two-aspect scenarios
where respondents choose between different increases in life worthwhileness in Option 1 versus
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increases in that third aspect in Option 2; and (c) three-aspect scenarios where respondents
choose between different increases in life satisfaction and life worthwhileness in Option 1 versus
increases in that third aspect in Option 2. Such a data collection effort would effectively replicate
our own SP survey, with three main differences: first, it would target pairs of questions where
overlap is suspected; second, it would involve only the relevant two- and three-aspect scenarios
described in (a), (b), and (c) above; and third, it would adjust and refine the language in the
scenarios’ preamble to encourage respondents to interpret joint increases in pairs of questions in
specific ways, a point that we briefly discuss now.
While our SP-survey instructions may be sufficient when the SWB survey questions
under study are fundamental aspects, the formal theory we develop in the Web Appendix
highlights the importance of respondents’ interpretation of the implied changes in fundamental
aspects when the questions under study are not themselves one-to-one measures of fundamental
aspects. We present two propositions, relying on two alternative sets of assumptions regarding
respondents’ interpretations, each of which formally substantiates the validity of our overlapdetection method. However, as we discuss in the Web Appendix, developing the survey language
that would encourage respondents to interpret scenarios in one of the ways required by our
theory would necessitate a process of developing and testing survey instructions that goes
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, our appendix treatment suggests that the problem
of potential question overlap can be analyzed formally and addressed practically, and takes some
tentative steps in those directions.

VI.B. Abridged Index
From a pragmatic point of view, identifying a sub-list of survey questions that avoids
overlap (while fully covering the fundamental aspects in w) has an additional important
consequence: it shortens the list of questions to elicit. In what follows, we use the term “full
index” to refer to the well-being index that is based on such a shorter yet complete list, which we
assume consists of exactly J fundamental-aspect questions.30 Such a list may still however be

30

With J fundamental aspects in w, a complete no-overlap list has at most J questions: exactly J if they
are all fundamental-aspect questions, or fewer if some are “composite-aspect” questions, meaning that
they elicit non-fundamental aspects that are subutility functions (see the Web Appendix for a formal
definition and discussion). Such composite aspects can be substituted in the theory and in the index for
their underlying fundamental aspects.
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longer than the list of questions a governments is able (or willing) to regularly include on each
wave of its SWB survey. It may hence be important to also consider the two practical questions
from the Introduction with an added constraint: which items should a government include on a
SWB survey that is limited to only

questions? And, conditional on asking N questions (not

necessarily the optimal ones), how should the responses be weighted?
Conditional on a SWB survey eliciting responses
questions, a natural weighting approach is to seek weights,
index” ∑

, ,…,
,

,…,

to a given set of N
, such that the “abridged

is the best predictor of the full index in an R2 sense. The optimal weights will

generally no longer be proportional to the estimated marginal utilities because included questions
will proxy for excluded aspects with which they covary in the time series.31 If, in addition, the N
questions can be selected, then a natural selection approach is to select those that, weighted
optimally, best predict the time series of the full index. (Combination-aspect questions that have
been excluded from the full index due to overlap may be especially useful in this context.) Note
that the optimal set of N questions may not necessarily include the questions with the largest
marginal-utility estimates. For example, Deaton et al. (2011) argue that negative emotions
(whose coefficients we report in IV.C above as ranking only in the middle of our table 2) are
important to include on a government’s SWB survey due to their relatively high variance and
low covariance with other questions.
To construct an N-question abridged index that is optimal in the above sense of bestpredicting the full index, it would be necessary to first construct and track the full index, at least
for a few survey waves. In the theoretically ideal world of an infinite sample and unlimited
computing power, the optimal abridged index would be found by regressing the full index on all
possible sets of N questions, finding the set that maximizes R2. In practice, with a finite sample,
more sophisticated methods are needed to avoid overfitting in both selection of questions and
estimation of their coefficients. Miller (2002) provides a comprehensive discussion of such
methods.
Two additional points regarding an abridged index are worth mentioning. First, different
abridged indices may be optimal for different intended uses of the index. For example, if the
abridged index is used mainly to track individuals’ well-being over time, then the objective
31

Note that variants of our SP survey (including those referred to in VI.A) are not informative regarding
covariances because the SP survey exogenously varies the aspect bundles to be compared in a way
unrelated to time-series covariances of responses to the SWB survey.
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function to best-predict is a time-series of the full index (as proposed above). Alternatively, if the
index is used to guide policy, then question selection and weighting should account for the fact
that some aspects may vary a great deal but be relatively immune to policy, while others may
move little unless changed by policy (for example, Deaton et al. (2011) argue that stress may be
particularly sensitive to policy).
Second, if the questions’ variance-covariance matrix shifts over time, then an abridged
index’s optimal questions and weights may change even when the intended use is held fixed and
even if the marginal utilities have not changed. This point is related to the well-known Lucas
critique from macroeconomics; even if the underlying structural model is fixed, the best-fitting
reduced-form equation may be unstable as circumstances shift. For this reason, the full index
should be tracked at least periodically—e.g., by switching back, every few survey waves, from
the abridged survey to the full survey—and the optimal abridged index should be periodically reestimated.

VI.C. Pooling Respondents
While abridged indices would reduce the number of questions to ask on regular SWBsurvey waves, our discussion above makes it clear that at least periodically, it is crucial to
construct the full index. Hence, at least periodically, the full list of SWB questions and a full set
of marginal-utility estimates would be needed. Even if the full list of SWB questions is not by
itself considered too long to ask on a single SWB survey, multiple SP-survey questions are
required for estimating each marginal utility, and therefore estimating the full set of marginal
utilities may require a long survey. While breaking a long survey into shorter modules
administered to the same respondent on successive occasions may be feasible, a government
might wish to divide the full set of required SP questions across different respondents and pool
their responses. Under what conditions would doing so be justified?
Our theory in section I is restricted to an individual agent. Estimating marginal utilities
from pooled data is therefore theoretically justified only when the pooled respondents’
indifference surfaces have the same local slope. We refer to such respondents as being of the
same “type.”32 In practice, while it is unlikely that any two respondents are of exactly the same
32

Thus, even if two respondents have the same preferences, if their interpretation and reporting of their
w’s differ in a way that leads to indifference surfaces with different local slopes, then the respondents
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type, it may be possible to partition a population of respondents into approximate types. To do
so, one would need to conduct a full SP survey (long enough for identifying each respondent’s
local marginal utilities) on at least a subsample of respondents. One could then search for
observables (such as sex, age, etc.) that may characterize types.
In our own main specification in section IV, we pooled data across all of our respondents,
effectively treating them all as a single type. Doing so is difficult to justify theoretically, and as
discussed above governments should not—and would not have to—do so. That said, to the extent
that some of our estimates by several different demographic groups (reported in the Web
Appendix and summarized in IV.E) are viewed as not that different from each other, it is
possible that, as an empirical matter, pooling may yield sensible estimates.

VII. Concluding Remarks
Our current system of national accounts has been continually refined over many decades,
and continues to be revised. Converging on how well-being should be tracked is likely to be
similarly arduous. Much work has already been done. But that work, and our own
contributions—the theory and methodology, aspect list, and marginal-utility estimates—are only
a bare beginning. We address only a fraction of the issues in constructing well-being indices that
we are aware of, and there are surely many other issues we have not thought of.
Perhaps the most urgent unresolved theoretical issue is aggregation across individuals.
This issue is not specific to our approach. As a workaround, researchers (say, using aggregate
consumption or GDP as a welfare measure) often take the leap of assuming a representative
agent. If one were willing to assume a representative agent, a national well-being index could be
constructed from marginal-utility estimates like ours, together with average responses to a SWB
survey. Alternatively, including money in the SP survey as if it were an “aspect” would enable
scaling the marginal utilities in dollar units (see footnote 14). The change in the well-being index
could then be measured in dollars for each respondent and summed across respondents. As
another alternative, the same procedure could be followed with some other numeraire good; for
example, time might be an attractive numeraire. Other recent proposals regarding aggregation in
should be considered of different types. On the other hand, even if two respondents interpret an aspect
differently—for example, “being a good, moral person” could involve different behaviors that satisfy
different moral values for different people—the two are still of the same type as long as that aspect’s
relative marginal utility is the same at their current fundamental-aspect levels.
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the context of SWB surveys include Fleurbaey, Schokkaert, and Decancq (2009), Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2011), and Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Szembrot (2013).
Another set of concerns, emphasized by Frey and Stutzer (2007, 2012), hereafter FS, is
that if aggregated SWB responses were regularly used for policymaking, both governments and
individuals might have an incentive to manipulate the survey-based index for their own benefit.
One concern FS raise is that politicians and public officials have many degrees of freedom that
they may exploit when selecting questions, weights, and the respondent population used for
constructing an index. As FS observe, similar concerns also arise with traditional indicators such
as GDP and the rate of unemployment. We believe that—as with these traditional and widelyused indicators—having standardized procedures for constructing the index, such as the
procedures developed in this paper, can eliminate many of these degrees of freedom. Another
concern FS raise is that individuals may have an incentive to deviate from truthfully responding
to the SWB survey. While we are not aware of evidence of such conscious attempts by
individuals or interest groups to manipulate existing survey-based indicators such as the rate of
unemployment, we explore in a companion paper (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Szembrot,
2013) a mechanism for aggregating SWB responses and guiding policy that reduces incentives
for non-truthful responding.
Yet another set of concerns relates to measurement. While we have assumed throughout
that aspects of well-being can be meaningfully measured with a SWB survey, such measurement
still faces major challenges that we have not addressed. For example, traditional SWB measures
may be over-sensitive to immediate context, under-sensitive to lasting changes in life
circumstances, and subject to recalibration of the response scale (see Adler, 2012, for a
comprehensive critical review of these and other challenges). And of course all survey measures
are subject to measurement error.
We have focused on constructing a well-being index based on combining a SWB survey
with a SP survey. But the framework and method we have developed could be applied in three
additional directions. First, as mentioned above, one could use a SP survey to obtain weights for
existing indices of objective measures, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), that
currently use ad hoc weights. In that case, the objective measures—for the HDI: longevity,
education, and GDP per capita—would replace the aspects in the SP survey.
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Second, one could extend market-price-based indices, such as GDP, to incorporate other
factors using “price” imputations. Rather than a function of fundamental aspects, utility would be
modeled as a function of market goods as well as non-market goods such as leisure, social
relationships, and the environment. These goods would replace the aspects in the SP survey.
Third, while our SP survey and analysis are based on the assumption that respondents’
stated preferences can be used to assess welfare—an approach we find attractive on liberalist
grounds—our methodology could be adapted to accommodate alternative assumptions. For
example, if one assumed that life satisfaction equaled welfare, then one would replace our stated
choice question with a predicted-life-satisfaction question. Alternatively, one might replace
“you” with “someone like you” in the stated-choice question if one believed that the latter would
yield more reliable responses.
While we view this paper primarily as proposing a long-term agenda, our findings also
point to a few readily actionable steps. First, our results suggest prioritizing the measurement of
aspects related to family, health, and security; eudaimonic and especially evaluative SWB
measures; and, especially in the policy context, freedoms and capabilities. Second, as discussed
in section VI, for the purpose of selecting specific questions for regular inclusion on SWB
surveys, we highlight the value of gathering data on as many aspects as possible—at least
initially (cf. Deaton et al., 2011) and at regular intervals. Third, along with conducting SWB
surveys, we call for governments and researchers to devote resources to estimating aspects’
marginal utilities; our SP survey illustrates one method for doing so.
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Table 1. Respondent Demographics

Marital Status
Highest
Education
Level
Completed

Age

Income

Region

Race

Household
Size

Employment
Status

Married
Never Married
Other
High School Grad
Some College
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Degree
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-64
65 and older
less than $20,000
$20,000-39,999
$40,000-49,999
$50,000-74,999
$75,000-99,999
$100,000 and above
Midwest
Northeast
South
West
White
Black
Hispanic/Latino
Asian
Other
1
2
3
4 and above
Employed
Unemployed
Not in labor force

All
(N = 7391)
59.3
24.3
16.4
23.2
40.7
24.3
11.5
19.7
18.3
19.3
20.8
21.9
17.9
27.9
10.9
19.8
11.3
12.1
23.0
19.8
34.0
23.2
76.6
9.8
7.7
3.7
2.2
18.0
35.2
18.8
27.8
53.7
8.6
37.6

Completes
(N = 5397)
58.9
25.5
15.6
21.9
39.8
25.4
12.7
21.1
19.5
20.0
20.4
19.0
18.1
27.0
10.2
20.0
11.7
13.0
23.2
20.0
33.4
23.4
75.2
10.1
8.2
4.2
2.2
17.7
33.8
19.1
29.2
55.9
8.7
35.4

Primary
Sample
(N = 4608)
59.8
23.4
16.8
21.4
41.0
25.5
12.0
18.0
18.4
20.0
22.0
21.5
17.4
27.9
10.8
20.5
11.6
11.8
24.3
19.3
33.8
22.6
78.2
9.6
6.4
3.5
2.2
18.2
35.1
18.6
27.9
53.3
8.8
37.8

Census
Etc.
48.8
32.1
19.1
42.9
28.9
17.7
10.4
18.9
17.8
19.3
26.1
17.9
19.8
21.7
8.9
17.7
11.4
20.4
21.7
17.9
37.1
23.3
63.7
12.2
15.4
4.7
4.0
26.7
32.8
16.1
24.4
57.4
6.9
35.6

Notes: All numbers are percentages. “All”: respondents who began the survey. “Completes”: respondents who
completed all scenarios. “Primary Sample”: respondents who took at least 8 minutes to complete the survey.
Sources: Authors’ survey, 2010 American Community Survey, 2010 Census, 2011 Current Population Survey.
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Table 2. Relative Marginal Utility Estimates
Aspect
freedom from corruption, injustice, and abuse of power in your
nation
the overall well-being of you and your family
the happiness of your family
your health
you being a good, moral person and living according to your
personal values
the quality of your family relationships
society helping the poor and others who struggle
the morality, ethics, and goodness of other people in your nation
your financial security
freedom of speech and people’s ability to take part in the political
process and community life
the well-being of the people in your nation
your mental health and emotional stability
your sense of security about life and the future in general
you having many options and possibilities in your life and the
freedom to choose among them
the amount of freedom in society
your sense that your life is meaningful and has value
how satisfied you are with your life
you feeling that you have enough time and money for the things
that are most important to you
how much you like your life
how peaceful, calm, and harmonious your life is
your nation being a just society
your feeling of independence and self-sufficiency
your pride and respect for yourself
your sense that you are standing up for what you believe in
your sense that you are making a difference, actively contributing
to the well-being of other people, and making the world a better
place
how low the rate of unemployment is in your nation
how much you enjoy your life
trust among the people in your nation
equality of opportunity in your nation
the extent to which you feel the things you do in your life are
worthwhile
your physical safety and security
the well-being of the people in the world
you “being the person you want to be”
your freedom from being lied to, deceived, or betrayed
people getting the rewards and punishments they deserve
you having people you can turn to in time of need
the extent to which you "have a good life"
the condition of animals, nature, and the environment in the world
you having the people around you think well of you and treat you
with dignity and respect
how grateful you feel for the things in your life
your sense of control over your life
how much love there is in your life
how much you appreciate your life
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Coef.

Personal
S.E. Rank

Coef.

Policy
S.E.

Rank

0.39
0.33
0.24
0.29

0.026
0.033
0.024
0.025

0a
3
21
6

0.025
0.024
0.024
0.024
0.023

2
13
5a
5b
8

0.46
0.43
0.42

0.016
0.017
0.017

1
2
3

0.40
0.37

0.017
0.017

4
5

0.34

0.017

6

0.35
0.25
0.30
0.29
0.28
0.29
0.29
0.25
0.26

0.025
0.024
0.025
0.024

6a
6b
15
12

0.35
0.27
0.27
0.18

0.034
0.025
0.023
0.033

1
9a
9
53

0.21
0.19
0.24
0.25
0.23
0.19
0.21

0.023
0.031
0.024
0.023
0.024
0.024
0.025

32
46
18
14a
25
44
33

0.32
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.24

0.025
0.024
0.025
0.023
0.023

4
18a
17
19a
19b

0.24
0.24
0.24
0.17
0.30
0.23
0.28
0.24
0.22

0.032
0.023
0.024
0.024
0.026
0.025
0.024
0.032
0.026

23
22
21a
62
5
23a
7
19
25a

0.26
0.22
0.24
0.20
0.18

0.023
0.032
0.023
0.025
0.033

11
26
20
42
58

0.34
0.33

0.016
0.016

7
8

0.32

0.017

9

0.32
0.31

0.017
0.017

10
11

0.30
0.30
0.29

0.017
0.017
0.017

12
13
14

0.29
0.29
0.29

0.016
0.017
0.017

15
16
17

0.29

0.017

18

0.29

0.016

19

0.28
0.28

0.016
0.016

20
21

0.28
0.28

0.017
0.017

22
23

0.28
0.28

0.016
0.016

24
25

0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.27

0.017
0.017
0.017
0.016
0.016

26
27
28
29
30

Aspect
how much of the time you feel happy
your sense that things are getting better and better
your sense that you know what to do when you face choices in
your life
the extent to which humanity does things worthy of pride
you having people around you who share your values, beliefs and
interests
how often you smile or laugh
your ability to dream and pursue your dreams
your chance to live a long life
the amount of love in the world
how fulfilling your life is
how happy you feel
how glad you are to have the life you have rather than a different
life
your passion and enthusiasm about things in your life
you feeling alive and full of energy
your ability to fulfill your potential
how low the rate of inflation is in your nation’s economy
your ability to be yourself and express yourself
the absence of stress in your life
your ability to keep good perspective in your life
your sense of purpose
the amount of order and stability in your life
your freedom from pain
you feeling that things are going well for you
the quality of your romantic relationships, marriage, love life or
sex life
the absence of worry in your life
your sense that you are competent and capable in the activities
that matter to you
your physical comfort
the amount of order and stability in society
how full of beautiful memories your life is
your success at accomplishing your goals
your ability to shape and influence the things around you
the rate of economic growth (GDP growth) over time in your
nation
you feeling that your life has direction
how rewarding the activities in your life are
you getting the things you want out of life
your sense of optimism about your future
the average income of people in your nation (GDP per capita)
you feeling that you have been fortunate in your life
the extent to which your nation does things worthy of pride
your knowledge, skills, and access to information
the absence of sadness in your life
how often you can feel relaxed instead of feeling your life is
hectic
your sense of achievement and excellence
equality of income in your nation
the absence of frustration in your life
your freedom from emotional abuse or harassment
you not feeling depressed
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Coef.
0.27
0.27

Personal
S.E. Rank
0.017
31
0.016
32

Coef.
0.20
0.19

Policy
S.E.
0.025
0.032

Rank
41
49

0.26

0.016

33

0.18
0.21

0.023
0.024

55
33a

0.26
0.26
0.26
0.26

0.016
0.017
0.016
0.016

34
35
36
37

0.26
0.26

0.017
0.016

38
39

0.21
0.14
0.25
0.19
0.20
0.15
0.23

0.024
0.024
0.024
0.025
0.025
0.037
0.034

29
82
14
45
37a
78
24

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

0.016
0.016
0.016
0.016

40
41
42
43

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.24
0.24
0.24

0.016
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.016
0.017
0.016

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

0.15
0.15
0.15
0.21
0.19
0.19
0.15
0.18
0.21
0.18
0.26
0.21

0.034
0.024
0.023
0.022
0.024
0.023
0.024
0.025
0.023
0.023
0.022
0.035

73
77
76
28
43a
47
74
57
35
56
10
34

0.24
0.23

0.017
0.016

51
52

0.16
0.20

0.026
0.024

69
38

0.23
0.23

0.017
0.015

53
54

0.23
0.23
0.23

0.016
0.017
0.016

55
56
57

0.20
0.12
0.18
0.11
0.21
0.19

0.024
0.023
0.025
0.032
0.023
0.024

39
88
54a
90
36
50

0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22

0.017
0.016
0.017
0.016

58
59
60
61

0.22

0.016

62

0.22
0.22

0.016
0.017

63
64

0.18
0.16
0.16
0.15
0.22
0.17
0.18
0.17
0.21
0.20

0.026
0.023
0.034
0.033
0.034
0.024
0.033
0.024
0.023
0.024

57a
67
68
79
27
61a
54
62a
31
37

0.22
0.21

0.016
0.016

65
66

0.21
0.20
0.20

0.016
0.017
0.016

67
68
69

0.13
0.16
0.16
0.17
0.25
0.15

0.023
0.025
0.024
0.025
0.025
0.025

85
65
66a
61
16
80

Aspect
your ability to have and raise children
you feeling that you are part of something bigger than yourself
you having many moments in your life when you feel inspired
the amount of pleasure in your life
your personal growth
the happiness of your friends
how often you are able to challenge your mind in a productive or
enjoyable way
the absence of anger in your life
the quality of your sleep
you feeling that you understand the world and the things going on
around you
your sense that everything happens for a reason
the absence of fear in your life
how easy and free of annoyances your life is
how desirable your life is
your ability to fully experience the entire range of healthy human
emotions
your ability to use your imagination and be creative
your sense of discovery and wonder
freedom of conscience and belief in your nation
how close your life is to being ideal
your sense of community, belonging, and connection with other
people
you not being lonely
the total size of your nation's economy (GDP)
you feeling that you are understood
your absence of internal conflict (conflict within yourself)
the absence of regret you feel about your life
you not feeling anxious
how interesting, fascinating, and free of boredom your life is
you having new things, adventure, and excitement in your life
the amount of fun and play in your life
your sense of connection with the universe or the power behind
the universe
how much beauty you experience in your life
your material standard of living
the overall quality of your experience at work
you having a role to play in society
your opportunities to participate in ceremonies, cultural events,
and celebrations that are meaningful to you
how often you become deeply engaged in your daily activities (so
deeply engaged that you lose track of time)
your rating of your life on a ladder where the lowest rung is
“worst possible life for you” and the highest rung is “best possible
life for you”
the absence of shame and guilt in your life
you having a beautiful life story, or a life that is "like a work of
art"
the absence of humiliation and embarrassment in your life
you having others remember you and your accomplishments long
after your death
your ability to "be in the moment"
your enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing challenges
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Coef.
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.19
0.19

Personal
S.E. Rank
0.017
70
0.016
71
0.016
72
0.017
73
0.016
74
0.024 74a

Coef.
0.18
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.14

Policy
S.E.
0.024
0.024
0.025
0.024
0.024

Rank
59
60
71
43
81

0.19
0.19
0.19

0.016
0.017
0.016

75
76
77

0.15
0.19
0.09

0.024
0.025
0.025

75
51
96

0.19
0.18
0.18
0.17
0.17

0.016
0.016
0.017
0.016
0.016

78
79
80
81
82

0.15
0.09
0.20
0.07
0.09

0.025
0.024
0.026
0.025
0.035

70
95
40
98
97

0.17
0.17
0.16

0.016
0.017
0.016

83
84
85

0.16

0.017

86

0.19
0.16
0.11
0.13
0.12

0.024
0.023
0.024
0.024
0.032

48
66
91
85a
87

0.16
0.15

0.017
0.016

87
88

0.15
0.15
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.12

0.017
0.016
0.016
0.017
0.016
0.016
0.016

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

0.21
0.17
0.12
0.19
0.15
0.02
0.09
0.03
0.13
0.11

0.024
0.024
0.024
0.024
0.024
0.033
0.024
0.023
0.024
0.024

30
64
88a
52
72
105
94
103
86
89

0.12
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10

0.017
0.017
0.016
0.017
0.016

96
97
98
99
100

0.10
0.04
0.06
0.14
0.17

0.025
0.025
0.026
0.023
0.024

93
101
100
83
63

0.09

0.016

101

0.11

0.024

92

0.09

0.017

102

0.01

0.023

106

0.09
0.07

0.016
0.016

103
104

0.04
0.00

0.030
0.025

102
107

0.07
0.07

0.016
0.016

105
106

0.13
0.07

0.034
0.025

84
99

0.04
0.04
0.04

0.022
0.017
0.016

106a
107
108

-0.02
0.02

0.023
0.024

108
104

Personal
Policy
Aspect
Coef. S.E. Rank Coef. S.E. Rank
how high your income is compared to the income of other people
around you
0.03 0.022 108a
your social status
-0.06 0.022 108b
your power over other people
-0.09 0.022 108c
Notes: Personal panel: OLS regression of stated preference on 113 personal aspects and a constant (const. = –0.02,
s.e. = 0.003), using personal choice scenarios (N = 50,688). Policy panel: OLS regression of stated preference on the
131 policy aspects and a constant (const. = –0.01, s.e. = 0.004) using the policy vote scenarios (N = 23,040).
Standard errors clustered at the respondent level. For the 108 aspects that have versions that appear in both types of
scenarios, the text used in the personal choice scenarios is shown; in policy choice scenarios, “people” and
“people’s” replace “you and “your.” For each scenario type, the numbers 1–108 are used to rank, by coefficient size,
aspects that appear in both scenario types. An aspect that appears in one scenario type receives a rank with a letter:
5a, for example, indicates that the coefficient was between the aspects ranked 5 and 6.

Figure 1. Partial Welfare Ordering from Non-Local Changes in the Well-Being Index
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Figure 2. Relative Marginal Utility Estimates
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Notes: Aspect coefficients by rank, from benchmark OLS regressions (table 2), separately for 113 personal-scenario
aspects (x’s) and 131 policy-scenario aspects (triangles).

Figure 3. Relative Marginal Utility Estimates: 108 you- and everyone-aspects
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Notes: Aspect coefficients from benchmark OLS regressions (table 2) for the 108 you-aspects (from personal
scenarios, x’s) and their corresponding 108 everyone-aspects (from policy scenarios, triangles), by rank in the
personal scenarios. Dashed curve: local linear regression of everyone-coefficients (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth
= 6).
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